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Judicial Ideology and the Survival of the Rule of

Law:
A Field Guide to the Current Political War over the
Judiciary
Stephen B. Presser*

I.

SHOULD JUDGES BE LEGISLATORS? THE BASIC PROBLEM

While virtually the entire legal academy has eschewed the notion for
some time,1 one can still find those outside academia who claim that

*Raoul Berger Professor of Legal History, Northwestern University School of Law, Professor of
Business Law Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, Legal Affairs Editor,
Chronicles: A Magazine of American Culture. Thanks to my indefatigable Faculty Assistant,
Tim Jacobs, for valuable research assistance on this piece.
1. For but a single example of the current belief in the legal academy, see Adam N. Steinman,
A Constitutionfor Judicial Lawmaking, 65 U. Prrr. L. REV. 545, 547 (2004), who begins his
piece by flatly declaring: "Judges make law." He supports this assertion with his impressive
footnote 4:
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: The SUPREME COURT AT
THE BAR OF POLITICS 16-23 (1962); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST:
A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 1-9 (1980); Aharon Barak, Foreward: A Judge on
Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy, 116 HARV. L. REV. 16, 62
(2002) ("Judges make law, and the public should know that they do."); Christopher J.
Peters, Adjudication as Representation, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 312, 315 (1997) ("[Clourts
do make laws (or, if you prefer, rules) that govern us[.]"); Edward L. Rubin &
Malcolm M. Feeley, JudicialPolicy Making and Litigation Against the Government, 5
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 617, 639 (2003) ("As virtually every political scientist who studies
courts asserts, and as discussed at length in our book, courts make public policy.");
Frederick Schauer, Opinions as Rules, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 682, 684 (1986) (reviewing
BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF THE WARREN COURT (1985))
(noting that "the words of a[] [judicial] opinion take on a canonical role not unlike that
played by the words in a statute").
Id. at 547 n.4. This attitude on the part of the legal academy probably dates back to the time that
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. claimed in 1881 that the judicial role was essentially a legislative one.
That was the theme of Holmes' masterpiece, OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON
LAW (43rd prtg., Little, Brown, & Co. 1949) (1881). See also S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S.
205, 221 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("I recognize without hesitation that judges do and must
legislate .... "). It was certainly firmly established in some academic quarters by the time
Holmes' hint was picked up and amplified in JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND
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ours "is a government of laws, not men." 2 The assertion that courts
follow the law and do not make it up as they go along is arguably the
single most important principle that guided the framers of the
Constitution. In the famous FederalistNo. 78, the essay that set forth
the justification of judicial review, Hamilton quotes the Baron de
Montesquieu's argument that "there is no liberty if the power of judging
3
be not separated from the legislative and executive powers."
Montesquieu's thoughts mirrored those of Sir William Blackstone, the
man who wrote the books that profoundly aided the formation and
development of an American Common Law.4 In his first volume
Blackstone stated:
[L]iberty, rightly understood, consists in the power of doing whatever
the laws permit; which is only to be effected by a general conformity
of all orders and degrees to those equitable rules of action, by which
the meanest individual is protected from the insults and oppression of
the greatest.5
This is a basic statement of the rule of law. It is that one's status in
society, whether aristocrat or plebian, does not determine one's rights;
rather, the law applies equally to all. The inescapable implication of this
is that if a judge changes the law, there is a potential loss of liberty,
because the change alters what the law permits and risks favoring some
persons over others. Blackstone continues:
[T]he liberty of considering all cases in an equitable light must not be
indulged too far, lest thereby we destroy all law, and leave the
decision of every question entirely in the breast of the judge. And law,
without equity, [though] hard and disagreeable, is much more
desirable for the public good, than equity without law; which would
make every judge a legislator, and introduce most infinite confusion;
as there would then be almost as many different rules of action laid
down in our courts, as there are differences of capacity and sentiment
in the human mind. 6

(1931). On the misbegotten nature of Holmes' work, see generally ALBERT W. ALSCHULER,
LAW WITHOUT VALUES: THE LIFE, WORK, AND LEGACY OF JUSTICE HOLMES (2000).
2. See, e.g., infra notes 83-87 and accompanying text (discussing comments by Republican
senators).
3. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), reprinted in THE FEDERALIST PAPERS 465
(Clinton Rossiter ed., Signet Classic 2003) (1961) (quoting BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE
SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 152 (Thomas Nugent trans., Hafner Publ'g Co. 1949) (1748)).
4. On Blackstone's importance to American Law, see DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE
MYSTERIOUS SCIENCE OF THE LAW (Beacon Press 1958) (1941).
5. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 6 (1765).
6. Id. at 62.
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With these words, Blackstone demonstrated his understanding that
sometimes legal traditions give judges small discretion to bend the rules
to render justice in the individual case, but this does not give judges
license to dispense entirely with the rules themselves. Blackstone goes
on to emphasize:
[The common law] is not in the breast of any subsequent judge to alter
or vary from, according to his private sentiments: he being swom to
determine, not according to his own private judgment, but according
to the known laws and customs of the land; not delegated
to
7
pronounce a new law, but to maintain and expound the old one.
These words of Blackstone and the framers are rarely noticed in the
legal academy today. No serious student of the United States Supreme
Court can deny that, for some time now, the Court has been in the
business of making rather than interpreting law. 8 Indeed, we have
moved so far away from a basic separation of powers theory that it can
be argued that courts, even state courts, are "partners" with the
legislature in making law. 9 It has been obvious since at least the time of
the Legal Tender cases,10 or perhaps since 1937 when the Supreme
Court radically altered its views regarding freedom of contract and the
sweep of Congress' powers under the Commerce Clause, that the
Supreme Court was making it up as it went along, and that the outcome

7. Id. at 69.
8. For a discussion, see, e.g., STEPHEN B. PRESSER, RECAPTURING THE CONSTITUTION:
RACE, RELIGION, AND ABORTION RECONSIDERED (1994) [hereinafter RECAPTURING]. Alas,
even Justice Antonin Scalia appears to concede the point. James B. Beam Distilling Co. v.
Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 549 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("I am not so naive (nor do I think our
forebears were) as to be unaware that judges in a real sense 'make' law.").
9. See, e.g., Philip H. Corboy et al., Illinois Courts: Vital Developers of Tort Law as
Constitutional Vanguards, Statutory Interpreters, and Common Law Adjudicators, 30 LOY. U.
CHI. L.J. 183, 190 (1999) (noting that while the legislature is the primary lawmaker, "[liegislative
supremacy, however, must be distinguished from legislative exclusivity. Legislatures are not and
have never been the sole lawmakers. Rather, state courts have the authority to create common law
doctrines which embody their own view of public policy, subject to constitutional legislative
modification").
10. The "Legal Tender" cases involved the constitutionality of a federal civil war measure
which made paper money "legal tender" for debts which had formerly only been payable in
specie. In a 4-3 decision, Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. 603 (1870), the United States Supreme
Court found the statute unconstitutional. Less than two years later in 1871, after two more
Justices had been added to the Court by President Grant, the Court reversed course in Parkerv.
Davis, 79 U.S. 457 (1871), and decided that the statute was constitutional. As one account to be
found on the web written by the distinguished commercial legal historian Gerald Dunne, has it:
"Although the Legal Tender Cases upheld broad congressional power over the currency, they
impaired the Court's reputation for political independence and consistency." Gerald T. Dunne,
Legal Tender Cases, http://www.answers.com/topic/legal-tender-cases.
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of cases would vary with the appointment of different Justices.1 1
Nevertheless, what was done in later decades by the Court under Earl
Warren and Warren Burger seemed different in quantity if not quality.
In the 1950s and 1960s, to a degree never seen before, the Court
narrowed the reach of state and local authorities to regulate education,
religion, redistricting, and abortion in a manner that represented a
radical break with the past. The issue of judge-made law failed to
inflame most of the population, at least until the 1980s, perhaps because
the Court reached results' 2 that accorded with the desires of an
increasingly liberal national media, if not the politically dominant
leaders of the Democratic party. Although "judges as law-makers" was

occasionally a campaign issue for Republican candidates for office, 13
it
never seemed to gain much traction with the American electorate.
Because these results were in accord with the desires of an increasingly
liberal American legal professoriate, volumes constructing abstruse
legal doctrinal theories were written defending the Warren Court and its
14
progressive decisions, justifying what had been done.

Furthermore, Republican Presidents vowed they would appoint "strict
constructionists" to the Court, by which presumably they meant justices
who would leave lawmaking to the legislatures and to the Constitutional

11. In NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), the United States Supreme
Court, as part of the so-called "switch in time that saved nine," effectively, granted Congress
much greater regulatory powers under the Commerce Clause by overruling the narrow
construction of that clause engaged in just two years earlier in Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). Further, in Jones & Laughlin Steel, the Court refused to bar
regulation of employment contracts in the manner it had earlier in a line of cases, of which
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), was the most prominent.
12. These results included desegregation of the public schools, ending the hegemony of
Christianity in the public square, limiting the basis for selection in the state legislatures to units of
similar population ("one-man, one vote"), and the creation of a "Constitutional right to privacy"
which encompassed a right for married couples to secure means of contraception, and eventually
included a broad right for women to secure abortions. For details, see, e.g., RECAPTURING, supra
note 8.
13. Id. at 27, 174 (suggesting that it is no coincidence that since these decisions, Republicans
have been substantially outnumbered in the House and have only controlled the Senate for brief
periods).
14. See, e.g., ARCHIBALD Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN
GOVERNMENT (Oxford Univ. Press 1978) (1976) (examining the Supreme Court's role in
American government and society); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY
OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980) (putting forth the author's theory of judicial review); MICHAEL J.
PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AN INQUIRY INTO THE
LEGITIMACY OF CONSTITUTIONAL POLICYMAKING BY THE JUDICIARY (1982) (inquiring into the
legitimacy of constitutional policymaking that goes beyond the value judgments of the framers of
the Constitution).
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Amendment process. 15 However, it was a Republican appointee, Harry
Blackmun, who wrote Roe v. Wade, the decision that found a
constitutional guarantee that women could abort a fetus before
viability. 16 Three more Republican appointees-Sandra Day O'Connor,
Anthony Kennedy, and David Souter-confirmed that right in 1992 in
Planned Parenthoodv. Casey.17
The 1992 Casey decision and many other decisions of the Warren,
Burger, and Rehnquist courts suggested to a substantial number of legal
conservatives in the academy in the 1990s that something was very
wrong on the Supreme Court. 18 This understanding dovetailed with the

Republican Party's campaign for the Presidency in 2000, when George
W. Bush announced that his favorite Justices were Clarence Thomas
and Antonin Scalia. 19 These two justices had made it clear in their
opinions that separation of powers remained important, and that it was
wrong for the Court to make law. Those two were committed to what
eventually came to be called "originalism," or "original understanding"
jurisprudence, according to which the goal of constitutional
interpretation is to derive the meaning of the words as they would have
been understood by a reasonable person in 1789 at the time of the
Constitution's framing, or at later dates when particular Constitutional
Amendments were passed.2 ° Using this approach, Scalia argued that
there is no constitutional "right of privacy" which guarantees women
the right to choose to terminate pregnancies. 2 1 Clarence Thomas used

15. RECAPTURING, supra note 8, at 5, 27 (noting that such promises were made by Richard
Nixon, Ronald Reagan, and George H.W. Bush).
16. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Blackmun was appointed by Richard Nixon in 1970.
17. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). Sandra Day O'Connor was
appointed by Ronald Reagan in 1981, Anthony Kennedy was appointed by Ronald Reagan in
1988, and David Souter was appointed by the first President Bush, in 1990.
18. See generally RECAPTURING, supra note 8 (explaining the relationship between morality,
religion, and constitutional law).
19. See Stephen B. Presser, The Scalias Court, LEGAL AFFAIRS, Sept./Oct. 2004,
http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/September-October-2004/feature-presser-sepoctO4.msp
[hereinafter Scalias Court] (commenting on Bush's statement that Thomas and Scalia are "model
judges").
20. For the most sophisticated articulation of originalism as a constitutional theory of
interpretation, see KEITH WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL
MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (1999). For Scalia's view, see ANTONIN
SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (1997).
21. Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 980 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part) ("The issue is whether it is a liberty protected by the Constitution of the United States. I am
sure it is not. I reach that conclusion not because of anything so exalted as my views concerning
the 'concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life ... '
Rather, I reach it for the same reason I reach the conclusion that bigamy is not constitutionally
protected-because of two simple facts: (1)the Constitution says absolutely nothing about it, and
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such an approach to argue that racial discrimination by state and local
governments to pursue affirmative action is unconstitutional on the
theory that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment wanted a "colorblind constitution."22 Thomas also argued that the First Amendment
was designed to protect state establishments of religion, not to allow the
23
federal courts to mandate a secular public square.
One other notable jurist, Judge Douglas Ginsburg, suggested that a
true originalist must engage in a much narrower construction of the
Commerce Clause to significantly restrict the ambit of permissible
congressional lawmaking, which might well require the nullification of
24
civil rights legislation, as well as many federal economic regulations.
Others, agreeing with Ginsburg, called for the return of this originalist

(2) the longstanding traditions of American society have permitted it to be legally proscribed.")
(citation omitted).
22. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 353 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("The Constitution
abhors classifications based on race, not only because those classifications can harm favored
races or are based on illegitimate motives, but also because every time the government places
citizens on racial registers and makes race relevant to the provision of burdens or benefits, it
demeans us all. 'Purchased at the price of immeasurable human suffering, the equal protection
principle reflects our Nation's understanding that such classifications ultimately have a
destructive impact on the individual and our society."') (citation omitted).
23. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 45-46 (2004). Justice Thomas
concurred in the judgment and explained his view that the "establishment clause" is a "federalism
provision" which means that it should not be "incorporated" via the Fourteenth Amendment
against the states. Id. This would leave the states free to decide what to do with the integration of
religion into the public square. Id.
24. For what seems to be Judge Ginsburg's first use of the phrase "Constitution-in-Exile," see
Douglas Ginsburg, Delegation Running Riot, REGULATION: THE CATO REVIEW OF BUSINESS
AND GOVERNMENT 1995, http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regl8nlf.html (reviewing DAVID
SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: How CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE
THROUGH DELEGATION (1993)). In that review, originally published in 1995, Judge Ginsburg
stated that:
[F]or 60 years the nondelegation doctrine has existed only as part of the Constitutionin-exile, along with the doctrines of enumerated powers, unconstitutional conditions,
and substantive due process, and their textual cousins, the Necessary and Proper,
Contracts, Takings, and Commerce Clauses. The memory of these ancient exiles,
banished for standing in opposition to unlimited government, is kept alive by a few
scholars who labor on in the hope of a restoration, a second coming of the Constitution
of liberty-even if perhaps not in their own lifetimes.
Id. It has been argued that Clarence Thomas' adherence to the "Constitution-in-Exile"
movement, as demonstrated by his concurrence in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 587
(1995):
would likely doom the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Americans with Disabilities Act,
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the sick leave portions of the Family and
Medical Leave, the Freedom of Access to Clinics Act, as wells [sic] as minimum wage
and maximum hour laws and labor and environmental laws.
Chris Bowers, Clarence Thomas Joins Constitution in Exile Movement, MyDD Direct
Democracy Blog (June 1, 2005), http://www.mydd.com/story/2005/6/l/14162/59646.
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"Constitution-in-exile." 2 5 The notion of a "Constitution-in-exile"
purportedly supported by a group of conservative scholars, and the
opposition to that notion by liberal scholars, underscore that what is at
stake is a basic disagreement about the nature of the Constitution itself.
There is a basic disagreement about whether it is proper for the courts to
rewrite that document. In the rest of this paper, I will flesh out the
nature of that current disagreement, especially as it manifests itself
today in debates in the United States Senate. I suggest that there is still
much to be said for the older and simpler view that courts should not
legislate, and I argue that the critics of that conservative view are
misguided.

II.

THE INVENTION OF "JUDICIAL IDEOLOGY" AND THE ATTACK ON
REPUBLICAN JURISTS

Prominent Democratic Senators, aided by prominent Democratic law
professors and activists, were alarmed by the idea that George W.
Bush's appointees to the Supreme Court might seek to recapture "the
Constitution-in-Exile." 26 Accordingly, they invoked a new reading of
the Constitution; they sought to implement a theory of jurisprudence
that would perpetuate the power of judges to make law and seriously
alter our understanding of the separation of powers. According to New
York Senator Charles Schumer's (D-N.Y.) stated views at hearings he
convened on "judicial ideology," 2 7 it was the responsibility of the
United States Senate, exercising its "advise and consent" functions with
regard to presidential nominees to the federal bench, to ensure that the

25.

For a critique of those who would like to return to the "Constitution-in-Exile," see e.g.,

CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RADICALS IN ROBES: WHY EXTREME RIGHT-WING COURTS ARE WRONG

FOR AMERICA 54-55 (2005)
interpretation).

(critiquing

the "originalist"

approach to constitutional

26. The "Constitution-in-Exile" has become an essentially pejorative term used by liberal law
professors such as Cass Sunstein to represent the thought of judicial conservatives who believe, in
particular, that the United States Supreme Court has gone too far in allowing Congress to impose
regulation through the Commerce Clause. For a discussion of whether there really is such a thing
as the "Constitution-in-Exile Movement," see Posting of Orin Kerr to the Volokh Conspiracy
Blog (Dec. 29, 2004 at 12:57 PM), http://volokh.com/posts/chain_110434663 1.shtml. For a
more scholarly approach to the question of the "Constitution-in-Exile," see William W. Van
Alstyne, The Constitution In Exile: Is it Time to Bring It In From The Cold?, 51 DUKE L. J. 1

(2001), and other articles and sources cited in the Oct. 2001 Symposium issue of the Duke Law
Journal.
27. JudicialNominations: Should Ideology Matter?; The Senate's Role in the Nomination and
Confirmation Process: Whose Burden?: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Oversight and
the Courts of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2001) [hereinafter Ideology Hearings].
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judiciary was not dominated by any particular "judicial ideology." 28 It
thus became the task of the Senate to make sure that there was a
"balance" of ideologies on the benches of the lower federal courts and
29
of the Supreme Court.
For Senator Schumer and his liberal advisors, there were at least two

"judicial ideologies."

30

One was the ideology of the Bush nominees,

presumably "originalism"-the idea that a judge should follow the
original understanding of the Constitution and laws. 3 1 The other
ideology, referred to as the more progressive view exemplified by the
Warren Court, was that it was the job of the justices and judges to create
a "living Constitution," the meaning of which changes as the needs of
the times dictate. 32 Senator Schumer maintained that it was the
responsibility of each individual nominee to prove to the Senate that he
or she would not contribute to an imbalance of ideologies on the
33
bench.
28. For an analysis of those hearings, see Stephen B. Presser, Should Ideology of Judicial
Nominees Matter?: Is the Senate's Current Reconsideration of the Confirmation Process
Justified?, 6 TEx. REV. L. & POL. 245, 264 (2001) [hereinafter Ideology].
29. Id.
30. See Ideology Hearings, supra note 27 (testimony of Professor Laurence Tribe of Harvard
Law School, Cass Sunstein of the University of Chicago Law School, and Marcia Greenberger of
the National Women's Law Center). The story of these three advising Democratic senators on a
strategy to battle Bush nominees can be found in Byron York, Back to Bork?: A New Strategy of
Demanding Nominees' Views on Judicial Issues Ensures That the Next Supreme Court
Nomination Battle Will Be Ugly, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 2003, at 30-35.
31. See Ideology, supra note 28, at 248-52 (describing the "originalist" judicial philosophies
of Alexander Hamilton, President George W. Bush, and Justices Scalia and Thomas).
32. A classic description of the "living constitution" can be found in William Rehnquist,
Observation: The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEx. L. REV. 693 (1976). For a take on
"judicial ideologies" that is somewhat more sophisticated than a simple differentiation between
the "living constitution" and the "originalist" view, see SUNSTEIN, supra note 25 (describing four
different constitutional jurisprudential approaches: (1) perfectionism (which roughly corresponds
to the "living constitution" approach), (2) minimalism (which is sort of "living constitution" lite),
(3) majoritarianism (which defers to the legislature to the greatest degree), and (4)
fundamentalism (which is essentially the "original understanding" view)).
33. Ideology Hearings, supra note 27, at 112; see also Ideology, supra note 28, at 261-65
(exploring Senator Schumer's ideas on who has the burden of proof in convincing the Senate it
should confirm nominees). Having experienced a year with Justices Roberts and Alito on the
bench, Senator Schumer, who now declares that the Senate was misled as to the judicial ideology
of these two Bush nominees, has recently reiterated his view that nominees have a burden of
persuading the Senate that their judicial ideology is acceptable. In a recent fiery speech to the
liberal American Constitution Society, Senator Schumer declared: "The burden always lies with
the nominee to show that he or she [has a judicial ideology that is] within the mainstream. And
that burden cannot be met, as we've seen, by mouthing pleasant platitudes about modesty and
stability at a confirmation hearing." Press Release, Schumer Declares Democrats Hoodwinked
Into Confirming Chief Justice Roberts, Urges Higher Burden Of Proof For Any Future Bush
Nominees (July 27, 2007), available at http://www.senate.gov/-schumer/SchumerWebsite/
pressroom/record.cfm?id=280107.
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The U.S. Constitution says nothing about judicial ideology or about
who bears the burden of proving a nominee fit or unfit for judicial
office. 34 Still, because the Senate's role is to "advise and consent,"
some deference ought to be owed to the President's nominations. In
light of this constitutional language, it seems logical to place the burden
of proving a nominee unfit for office on any Senators who opposed his
or her nomination. The Federalist,the greatest contemporary guide to
the Constitution, suggests that the only grounds for resisting a
nomination are cases in which the President has abused his or her
discretion, such as by nominating unqualified political cronies or
relatives. 3 5 By inventing a new "judicial ideology" element, Senator
Schumer and his colleagues came up with a pretext to reject even the
most superbly qualified nominations to the Supreme Court.
The witnesses called by the Republicans at the Judiciary
subcommittee hearings on "judicial ideology," at which I was privileged
to testify, attempted to argue that the idea of "judicial ideology" was a
pernicious partisan fabrication, and that the only appropriate judicial
philosophy was one of adherence to the rule of law. Therefore, the only
appropriate grounds for resisting a nominee are lack of knowledge of
the law or an unwillingness to follow the law as laid down. 36 In other
words, they argued that there is one single appropriate approach to
judging, and not a variety of appropriate judicial "ideologies." If the
only appropriate role for judges is to conform their decisions to
prevailing law, as argued by Montesquieu, Blackstone, and Hamilton,
then to suggest there should be a "balance of ideologies" on the bench is
to suggest that "right" should be balanced with "wrong," or that "good"
37
needs to be balanced with "evil."
Senator Schumer and his advisors' notions about a "balance of
ideologies" gave the Democrats political cover to oppose Bush
nominees to the lower federal courts. It came close to giving the
Democrats a justification for insisting that each Bush nominee be
"balanced" with a nominee they favored. This would have given the
Senate's "advise and consent" role a meaning as powerful as that of the
President's Article II power to nominate judges. Senator Schumer was
fairly candid about his desire to bolster the Senate's power in the
34. See U.S. CONST. arts. I-III.
35. See Ideology, supra note 28, at 247-49, 263 (examining what Alexander Hamilton had to
say about how the Senate ought to exercise its "advise and consent" function when reviewing
nominees to the bench).
36. Id.at 262.
37. Stephen B. Presser, What a Real Conservative Believes About Judicial Ideology, 6 GREEN
BAG 285, 286 (2003).
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judicial confirmation process; however, when Republicans threatened to
revise the Senate rules so as to forbid filibustering of judicial
nominations-a tactic which effectively required the consent of sixty
Senators to confirm a judicial nominee-Republican and Democratic
Senators struck a deal to allow most of the then-pending Bush nominees
to the Court of Appeals to be confirmed.3 8
Deference to Bush nominees, however, ended in 2006, when the
Democrats succeeded in capturing a majority of the Senate seats, and
very little has been heard lately of "judicial ideology" in the Senate
itself. Before that happened, however, there were two interesting
episodes where the idea of judges following the rule of law was
reaffirmed, and the notion of multiple approaches to judging ostensibly
repudiated. These were the confirmation hearings of George W. Bush's
two nominees to the United States Supreme Court: John Roberts and
Samuel Alito.
III. THE ROBERTS HEARINGS: DEMOCRAT AND REPUBLICAN TAKES ON
THE RULE OF LAW, SEPARATION OF POWERS, AND THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY
In the next two sections, I will examine how the confirmation
hearings of John Roberts and Samuel Alito offered an opportunity for
Democrat and Republican Senators to articulate two very different ideas
of what a Supreme Court Justice ought to do. In general, the
Republicans took the position that the only important questions to ask
were about the qualifications of the nominee. In particular, they wanted
to know whether the nominee was prepared to commit to the
proposition that judges should judge and legislatures should legislate.
The Democrats, however, following the lead of Senator Schumer,
argued that it was appropriate to examine the "judicial ideology" of the
nominee in order to discern the likely substantive outcome of the cases
he would decide. The Democrats also took the position that it was the
job of a justice to expand the set of rights articulated by expansive
Warren and Burger court decisions.
The nominee for Chief Justice, John Roberts, sat for a short time on
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
and was regarded before he ascended the bench as one of the best
appellate advocates in the nation. 39 During his confirmation hearings,

38. Gang of 14, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gang-of_14 (describing the details
of the political deal allowing most of the Bush nominees to the Court of Appeals to be
confirmed).
39. See, e.g., Jeffrey Smith & Jo Becker, Record of Accomplishment-And Some
Contradictions,THE WASH. POST, July 20, 2005, at AOl ("One hundred forty-six members of the
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borrowing from baseball, Roberts gave his definition of what the rule of
law required:
[A] certain humility should characterize the judicial role. Judges and
justices are servants of the law, not the other way around. Judges are
like umpires. Umpires don't make the rules, they apply them. The
role of an umpire and a judge is critical. They make sure everybody
plays by the rules, but it is4 0 a limited role. Nobody ever went to a
ballgame to see the umpire.
Explaining that he did not "fully appreciate the importance of the
Supreme Court in our constitutional system until he began to argue
cases against the United States," Roberts added:
Here was the United States, the most powerful entity in the world,
aligned against my client, and yet all I had to do was convince the
Court that I was right on the law, and the Government was wrong, and
all that power and might would recede in deference to the rule of law.
That is a remarkable thing. It is what we mean when we say that we
are a Government of laws and not of men. It is4 1that rule of law that
protects the rights and liberties of all Americans.
For Roberts, the job of a judge is only to follow the rule of law, not to
pursue a particular ideology, or to set out to secure a certain set of
results. The job of a judge is not to make the rules, but to follow them.
He underscored this with a few final flourishes:
Mr. Chairman, I come before the committee with no agenda. I have
no platform. Judges are not politicians who can promise to do certain
things in exchange for votes. I have no agenda, but I do have a
commitment. If I am confirmed, I will confront every case with an
open mind. I will fully and fairly analyze the legal arguments that are
presented. I will be open to the considered views of my colleagues on
the bench, and I will decide every case based on the record, according
to the rule of law, without fear or favor, to the best of my ability, and I
will remember that it's my job to call balls and strikes, and not to pitch
42
or bat.

A cynic might suggest that a nominee to the Supreme Court would
say anything to get confirmed, and thus Roberts' comments should not
be taken seriously. Most in the legal academy would probably so view

D.C. bar-Democrats as well as Republicans-signed a letter calling him 'one of the very best
and most highly respected appellate lawyers in the nation, and hailing his 'unquestioned integrity
and fair-mindedness."').
40. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of the
United States: HearingBefore the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55 (2005) [hereinafter
Roberts Hearings](statement of John G. Roberts, nominee for Chief Justice).
41. Id. at 55-56.
42. Id. at 56.
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Roberts' testimony, which they might characterize as naive at best or
duplicitous at worse. Yet the comments were made with the appearance
of sincerity. Furthermore, Roberts has manifested the same judicial
philosophy in subsequent public appearances. 43 Whether he is given
credence in the academy (or among Democrats) or not, he does appear
to believe that the role of judges is not to make law.
Judge Roberts was not the only one making that point. Roberts'
confirmation hearings began with remarks from Senator Arlen Specter
(R-Pa.), who was chairing the hearings. Senator Specter remarked
favorably that the new Chief Justice, because of his relative youth,
would have "a very unique opportunity ...to rebuild the image of the
court away from what many believe it has become a super-legislature..
•."44 Continuing in that vein, Senator Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) recognized
that:
The judicial selection process . . .has changed because what some
political forces want judges to do is change from what America's
founders established. America's founders believed [that] separating
the branches of Government with the Legislatures making the law and
the Judiciary interpreting and aglying the law [was] the linchpin of
limited Government and liberty.
Senator Hatch observed, however, "Today some see the separation of
powers not as a condition for liberty, but as an obstacle to their own
political agenda. When they lose in the legislature they want the
Judiciary to give them another bite at the political apple." 4 6 In closing,
Senator Hatch stated, "We must use a judicial rather than a political
standard to evaluate Judge Roberts' fitness for the Supreme Court. That
standard must be based upon the fundamental principle that judges
47
interpret and apply, but do not make the law."
Democratic Senators did not similarly endorse a modest judicial role
in the course of the Roberts hearings. Instead of stressing that the job of
the courts was to interpret, rather than make law, the Democrats on the
judiciary committee claimed that it was the job of a justice to further the
"progress" the Court had made in bettering the lot of the weakest and
43. Or so it seemed to me when he came to Northwestern to deliver a lecture and meet with
some students and faculty in the spring of 2007. For a similar comment from someone (a friend
and co-author of mine, who also has first-hand experience working in the Department of Justice
with John Roberts) see Douglas Kmiec, Why John Roberts Will Be a Superb Justice: Like Justice
O'Connor At Her Best, He Respects Constitutional Limits, FindLAW (July 25, 2005),
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/20050725_kmiec.html.
44. Roberts Hearings,supra note 40, at 2.

45. Id. at 7-8.
46. Id. at 8.
47. Id. at 10.
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poorest Americans, particularly minorities and women. 4 8 Senator
Kennedy said:
We need a Chief Justice who believes in the promise of America and
the guarantees of our Constitution, a person who will enter that
majestic building near here and genuinely believe the four inspiring
words inscribed in marble above the entrance: 'Equal Justice Under
Law.' I look forward to hearing from Judge Roberts about whether, if
he joins the Supreme Court, he will uphold the progress we have made
and will guarantee
that all Americans have their rightful place in the
49
Nation's future.
In short, at the Roberts confirmation hearings, the Republicans
claimed that they sought a Chief Justice who believed in the rule of law,
but the Democrats claimed it was their duty to make sure that the new
Chief Justice was committed to a particular substantive agenda.
Senator Chuck Grassley (R-Iowa) professed that it was the job of the
Senate "to ensure that each person appointed to the Federal bench will
be a true judge and not some sort of super-legislator." 50 Senator
Grassley went on, in contrast to Senator Kennedy, to state:
I believe that the nominee should be someone who knows he or she is
not appointed to impose his or her views of what's right or wrong. As
Chief Justice Marshall said over 200 years ago, the duty of the judge
is to say what the law 'is', not what it 'ought to be.' Moreover, the
nominee should be someone who not only understands, but truly
respects the equal roles and responsibilities of the different branches
51
of Government and the role of our States in the Federal system.
Senator Grassley maintained that:
[I]f we confirm individuals who are bent on assigning to themselves
the power to fix society's problems as they see fit, a bare majority of
these nine unelected and unaccountable men and women will usurp
the power of the people-hijacking democracy to serve their own
political prejudices. We do 5not
want to go down that road, and we
2
should not go down that road.
When the Senate Judiciary Committee came to vote on John Roberts'
nomination as Chief Justice, the nature of what was at stake-the
emerging difference over the judicial role between Democrats and
Republicans and the influence of some academics over the process-

48. See, e.g., id. at 12. Senator Kennedy stated: "we need to know his views on .. .the
removal of existing barriers to full and fair lives for women, minorities, and the disabled." Id.
49. Id. at 13.
50. Id. at 14.
51. Id.
52. Id.
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Senator Grassley, observing that almost all the
became clear.
Republicans had voted for Justice Ginsburg, on the grounds that she
was well-qualified for the Court and had not allowed her prior liberal
professional legal activities 5 3 to influence their vote, declared that
"maybe there's a whole new ballgame out there with people when you
have somebody with the competence of Judge Roberts, and we're going
to have the number of people voting against him that I anticipate will
vote against him." 54 Ginsburg was confirmed by a 96-3 vote; Roberts
was eventually confirmed by a 78-22 vote. 5 5 All the votes against him
56
were cast by Democrats.
Roberts was one of the most superbly qualified nominees ever to
come before the Senate. As Senator Specter, who chaired the session,
indicated, Roberts' qualifications included "Harvard College, Harvard
Law, magna cum laude, summa cum laude, [and] 39 cases argued
before the Supreme Court of the United States." 57 Considering these
qualifications, Senator Hatch observed:
I've been involved in every Supreme Court nomination hearing and
debate for the last [twenty-nine] years, and all but one of the current
Supreme Court justices, and I have never in my whole time here seen

53. As Senator John Cornyn (R-Tex.) said of Ginsburg during the executive session that
followed the Roberts hearings:
[S]he was not exactly a person that had held mainstream or consensus positions. She
spent most of her career representing one client-the American Civil Liberties
Union--on one side of issues. She'd supported taxpayer funding for abortion,
constitutional right to prostitution and polygamy. And she opposed Mother's and
Father's Days as discriminatory occasions. But nevertheless, Republicans on this
committee put that aside and supported her nomination because she had terrific
credentials, and because President Clinton was entitled to nominate someone to the
Supreme Court of his choosing, while the Senate performed its advice and consent.
Statements and Vote on Nomination of Judge John Roberts to be Chief Justice of the United
States: Hearing of the Exec. Sess. of the S. Judiciary Comm., 109th Cong. 32 (2005) [hereinafter
Roberts Executive Session].
54. Roberts Hearings,supra note 40.
55. Bill Mears, Roberts Sworn in as Chief Justice, CNN, Sept. 29, 2005,
http://www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/09/29/roberts.nomination/index.html (information giving
recent confirmation votes for Supreme Court Justices, including that for Justice Ginsburg in the
sidebar).
56. 124 CONG. REC. S10649-50 (Sept. 29, 2005) (Rolicall Vote No. 245). Those voting
against Roberts were Senators Akaka (D-Haw.), Bayh (D-Ind.), Biden (D-Del.), Boxer (D-Cal.),
Cantwell (D-Wash.), Clinton (D-N.Y.), Corzine (D-N.J.), Dayton (D-Minn.), Durbin (D-Ill.),
Feinstein (D-Cal.), Harkin (D-lowa), Inouye (D-Haw.), Kennedy (D-Mass.), Kerry (D-Mass.),
Lautenberg (D-N.J.), Mikulski (D-Md.), Obama (D-Ill.), Reed (D-R.I.), Reid (D-Nev.), Sarbanes
(D-Md.), Schumer (D-N.Y.), and Stabenow (D-Mich.). Id.
57. Roberts Executive Session, supra note 53, at 6.
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a witness who
made such sense and who literally was so superior in
58
every way.
Senator Hatch indicated that "when you look at that overall testimony
and record, it's pretty tough to vote against this man if you're really
serious about being fair on judicial nominations to the Supreme
Court." 59 Senator Hatch's statements implied that Roberts' opponents
were pursuing their ideological agenda at the expense of fairness in the
judicial nomination process. Senator Hatch closed his statement in
support of Roberts by quoting columnist David Broder of the
Washington Post, widely regarded as the dean of the Washington
pundits, who stated that Judge Roberts was "so obviously, ridiculously
well-equipped to lead government's third branch that it is hard to
imagine how any Democrats can justify a vote against his confirmation.
• . .-60 Senators Hatch and Grassley were, of course, suggesting that
only raw political concern and special interests could explain a vote
against Roberts. Senator Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.), the ranking member of
the committee, who ended up voting for Roberts, took umbrage at the
assertion that politics rather than merits dictated the votes of some of his
Democratic colleagues. Senator Leahy stated, "[T]o suggest that we are
running with special interest groups and the Republicans aren't-I think
when this final vote is, you'll find a lockstep vote on the Republican
side for Judge Roberts; you'll find a split vote on the Democratic side.
And it's kind of-you know, that sort of falls apart there." 6 1 Whatever
that meant, the Democrats on the Committee did seek to mount 62a
defense on the merits for the votes of some of them against Roberts,
particularly Senator Kennedy, who argued that as a conservative former
member of the Reagan administration, Roberts was simply likely to be
too insensitive to the needs of poorer Americans to be trusted as Chief
Justice. 63 David Broder wrote that during the hearings, Roberts was "so
far from the caricature of a conservative ideologue depicted by some of
the interest groups that their attacks seem absurd. '64 Nevertheless,
Senator Kennedy defended his announced vote against Roberts by tying
his negative response to Roberts to his purported belief in the "march of

58.
59.
60.
2005,
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting David S. Broder, Roberts' Sterling Showing, THE WASH. POST, Sept. 18,
at B07).
Id.
Id.at10.
Id.
Broder, supra note 60, at B07.
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progress" accomplished by the Supreme Court in the Warren years and
after stated:
The commitment to this march of progress was the central issue in
John Roberts' hearing. We asked whether he, as chief justice, would
bring the values and ideals and vision to lead us on the path of
continued equality, fairness and opportunity for all, or would he stand
in the way of progress by viewing the issues that come before the
court in a narrow and legalistic way, thereby slowly turning back65the
clock and eroding the civil rights and equal right gains of the past?
Senator Kennedy observed that Roberts had been an "aggressive
activist in the Reagan administration, eager to narrow hard-won rights
and liberties, especially voting rights, women's rights, civil rights and
disability rights." 66 For Senator Kennedy, "John Roberts was on the
wrong side of the nation's struggle to achieve genuine equality of
opportunity for all Americans; and despite many invitations to do so,
Roberts never distanced himself from the aggressively narrow views of
that young lawyer in the Reagan administration." 67 Senator Kennedy
conceded that "John Roberts is a highly intelligent nominee," but
believed that he evaded questions from Democratic Senators about how
he might rule on cases as Chief Justice. 6 8 Thus, after four days of
hearings, Senator Kennedy thought "we still know very little more than
we knew when we started."-69 Senator Kennedy noted Roberts'
statement that the judicial branch must decide cases according to the
"rule of law." 70 Senator Kennedy dismissed this idea by stating, "Of
course, everyone agrees with that. Each of us took an oath of office to
71
protect and defend the Constitution, and we take that oath seriously."
However, Senator Kennedy then qualified his agreement by stating that
"[t]he rule of law does not exist in a vacuum; constitutional values and
ideals inform all legal decisions." 72 According to Senator Kennedy,
Roberts "never shared with us his own constitutional values and
ideals." 73 Senator Kennedy quoted Roberts' statement "that a judge
should be like an umpire, calling the balls and strikes but not making
the rules," but added:

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Roberts Executive Session, supra note 53, at 10.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id
Id.
Id.
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Well, we all know that with any umpire, the call may depend on your
own point of view. An instant replay from another angle can show a
very different result. Umpires follow the rules of the game, but in
critical cases it may well depend on where they
are standing when
74
they make the call. The same is true of judges.
Roberts' supporters argued that he was committed to following
precedent and to a modest judicial role in which he would interpret
rather than make law. 75 Senator Kennedy argued this was unrealistic
and unwise, quoting the patron saint of American Legal Realism:
As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes famously stated, the life of the law
has not been logic; it has been experience. He has also said that legal
decisions are not like mathematics; if they were, we wouldn't need
men and women of reason and intellect to sit on the bench. We would
simply input the facts and the law into some computer and wait for a
mechanical result.
We all believe in the rule of law, but that is just the beginning of the
conversation when it comes to the meaning of the Constitution.
Everyone follows the same text, but the meaning of the text is often
imprecise and you must examine the intent of the Framers, the history
and the current reality. And this examination will lead to very different
76
outcomes depending on each justice's constitutional world view ....
Senator Kennedy's statement was a tour-de-force of the "living
constitution" view. 7 7 But he used this perspective to conclude that
senators must ask Roberts what his jurisprudential views were and ask
whether Roberts' view was "a full and generous view of our rights and
liberties and of government's power to protect the people, or [rather a]
narrow and cramped view of those rights and liberties and the
government's power to protect ordinary people? ' 78 Senator Kennedy
concluded that "[T]here [was] insufficient evidence to conclude that
Judge Roberts' view of the rule of law would include as paramount the
protection of basic rights ...

voting rights, women's rights, civil rights

and disability rights." 7 9 For Senator Kennedy, in "all the hoopla and
razzle-dazzle in four days of hearings," there was little to suggest "that a

74. Id.
75. For a very thoughtful example of an argument for confirming Roberts and the attack on
those who opposed his confirmation, see David N. Mayer, Mayerblog, Confirmation Abuse (Sept.
5, 2005), http://users.law.capital.edu/dmayer/blog/bloglndex.aspentry=20050905.asp.
76. Roberts Executive Session, supra note 53, at 11-12.
77. I have no proof to support this, but this part of Kennedy's explanation for his vote, and, in
particular, Kennedy's invocation of Holmes, certainly could have been drafted by a liberal law
professor such as Cass Sunstein or Laurence Tribe. See, e.g., York, supra note 30.
78. Roberts Executive Session, supra note 53, at 12.
79. Id.
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Chief Justice John Roberts would espouse anything less than the narrow
and cramped view that staff attorney John Roberts so strongly
advocated in the 1980s."80 For Senator Kennedy, Roberts had the
burden of showing that he was the kind of progressive on "basic rights"
that Kennedy was, and having failed to make that showing, in
Kennedy's opinion, Roberts did not deserve to be confirmed. Senator
Kennedy stated:
No one-no one-is entitled to become Chief Justice of the United
States. The confirmation of nominees to our courts by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate should not require a leap of faith.
Nominees must earn their confirmation by providing us with full
knowledge of their values and convictions they'll bring to decisions
that may profoundly affect our progress as a nation towards the ideal
of equality. Judge Roberts has not done so. His repeated reference to
the rule of law reveals little about the8 1values he would bring to the job
of Chief Justice of the United States.
Senator Kennedy thus embraced Senator Schumer's notion that the
nominee has the burden of proof in his hearings. For Senator Kennedy,
the nominee can only meet that burden by demonstrating that he was the
kind of "progressive" Holmesian legal realist Senator Kennedy thought
the Court needed. Only such a man or woman could be depended upon
to move the Constitution along a progressive path. That, for Senator
Kennedy, was the job of the Court. To confirm Roberts, Senator
Kennedy concluded, would be to put "at serious risk the progress we
have made towards our common American vision of equal opportunity
82
for all of our citizens."

80.
81.

Id.
Id.

82. Roberts Executive Session, supra note 53. In addition to the comments from Republican
Senators which follow, for the dangers of abandoning professional qualifications and adherence
to the rule of law as the most important factors in evaluating a nominee, see the comments of
Senator Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.):
If we could, if we could look at the person before us based on qualifications, character
and integrity and not have-require them to show an allegiance to a particular case or a
cause, it would serve the country well. Because liberals and conservatives come and
go, but the rule of law is bigger than all of our philosophies....
* . .And there needs to be one place left in American discourse and politics for the
quietness of the merits of individuals to trump the loudness of special interest groups.
And the last place I know of is the courtroom. And the reason that I think Justice
Roberts will be a justice for the ages: He's probably the most qualified guy, top two or
three people in the history of the nation, that he believes beyond anything else that the
rule of law is for the unpopular cause, is for the quiet discussion, not the loud political
campaign, and that he believes deep down and loves the law more than he loves
politics. And that's all you can ask of anybody that comes through our gatekeeping
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At the Roberts hearings, and those of Samuel Alito, the Republicans
claimed that their commitment was only to the rule of law, to a Supreme
Court which believed in the separation of powers and which would
devote itself to the interpretation of law rather than judicial legislation.
The Democrats, on the other hand, or at least a good portion of them,
demanded Justices that were committed to a "progressive agenda" to
implement a purported "common American vision of equal opportunity
for all our citizens." 83 Stated another way, one party committed to a
narrow reading of the Constitution consistent with the original
understanding of the framers, and another party committed to a broader
interpretation in order to preserve the right of privacy in general and a
constitutional right to abortion in particular. Pursuant to these goals, the
Republicans stressed the qualifications and the modest judicial
philosophy of Roberts, while some of the Democrats, most notably
Senators Kennedy, Schumer, Joseph Biden (D-Del.), and Dick Durbin
(D-Ill.), stressed that Roberts' history was not that of a champion of
civil rights and the right to privacy.
Thus, Senator Jon Kyl (R-Ariz.), in his closing statement before the
vote on Roberts, observed that even newspapers presumed liberal in
their editorial stance endorsed the confirmation of Roberts. 84 According
to the Chicago Tribune, Senator Kyl noted ". . . Roberts richly deserves
to be confirmed. He has the mind, the manner and the modesty to be a
fine Chief Justice. . . . His evident devotion to the law and to the
Constitution ought to humble those partisans who want Supreme Court
justices instead to evangelize for political causes .... . 85 Picking up the
theme of non-partisanship, Senator Kyl then quoted the Los Angeles
Times:
[i]t will be a damning indictment of petty partisanship in Washington
if an overwhelming majority of the Senate does not vote to confirm
John G. Roberts Jr. to be the next chief justice [sic] of the United
States. As last week's confirmation hearings made clear, Roberts is an
exceptionally qualified nominee, well within the mainstream
of
86
American legal thought, who deserves broad bipartisan support.
here; will you adhere to the law more than you'll adhere to anyone's political
philosophy?

Id.
83. See, e.g., supra notes 62-82 and accompanying text (discussing Democratic Senators'
statements during the Roberts confirmation).
84. Roberts Executive Session, supra note 53.
85. Id. (quoting from an editorial endorsement of John Roberts, Editorial, John Roberts for
Chief Justice, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 20, 2005, at C 18).

86. Id. (quoting from an editorial endorsement of John Roberts, Editorial, Confirm Roberts, L.
A. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2005, at B 12).
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And even the Washington Post, no friend of the Bush administration,
stated:
John G. Roberts should be confirmed as chief justice [sic] of the
United States. He is overwhelming[ly] well-qualified, possesses an
unusually keen legal mind and practices a collegiality of the type an
effective chief justice [sic] must [have]. He shows every sign of
commitment to restraint and impartiality. Nominees of comparable
quality have, after rigorous hearings, been confirmed nearly
unanimously. We hope
Judge Roberts will similarly be approved by a
87
large bipartisan vote.
For Senator Biden, though, the superb qualifications of Roberts
meant very little. As he put it, "though I and other committee members
gave Judge Roberts ample opportunity, in my view he did not provide to
the American people any assurances that he embraced fully the
Constitution's enduring values when it comes to fundamental
constitutional rights.... 88 Senator Biden's principal concern seemed
to be what he called the "right to privacy," 89 which more commonly
referred to as the "right of privacy," is the purported constitutional
foundation of Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthoodv. Casey. Senator
Biden compared Roberts' testimony to that of then-Judge Anthony
Kennedy's testimony at his confirmation hearings:
In response to the question.... about what factors he would use in
considering the scope of the right to privacy, Justice Kennedy stated
and I quote, 'The essentials of the right to human dignity, the injury to
the person, the harm to the person, the anguish to the person, the
inability of a person to manifest his or her personality, the inability of
a person to obtain his or her own self-fulfillment, the inability of a
person to reach his or her potential." 90
Those words of then-Judge Kennedy's, somewhat reworked, would
later emerge as the "mystery passage," in PlannedParenthoodv. Casey,
the 1992 case upholding Roe v. Wade.9 1 Senator Biden unfavorably

87. Id. (quoting from an editorial endorsement of John Roberts, Editorial, Confirm Roberts,
WASH. POST, Sept. 18, 2005, at B06).
88. Roberts Executive Session, supra note 53.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) ("Our cases recognize 'the right
of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into
matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.' Our
precedents 'have respected the private realm of family life which the state cannot enter.' These
matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime,
choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of
existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these
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compared Justice Kennedy's testimony to that of Roberts, who,
"declined to associate himself with anything approaching the broad
sweep of Justice Kennedy's vision, instead casting his formulation in a
very narrow and crabbed way. Not only would Judge Roberts not tell
this committee how broadly the right to privacy
extends; he declined
92
even to endorse the general right to privacy."
Senator Biden found it most disturbing that Roberts "repeatedly said
he believed in the right to privacy, as does, quote, 'every member of the
court, to some extent or another." 9 3 Senator Biden went on to say, "I
want to know to what extent [Roberts believes in the right to privacy]
because if [it is] the extent to which Thomas and Scalia believe in the
94
right to privacy, I cannot support in good conscience this man."
Thomas and Scalia had both indicated their view that whatever the
extent of the right to privacy it did not support the abortion rights
guaranteed by Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthoodv. Casey.95 Thus,
it is probably not too much of a leap to say that, in voting "no" for
Roberts, Senator Biden was endorsing the views of the purported author
of the "mystery passage," Justice Kennedy, and indicating that he would
not support a nominee who would not support Roe v. Wade. For
Senator Biden, then, as for his Democratic colleague, Senator Kennedy,
the most important matters in deciding whether to support or oppose the
Roberts nomination were not Roberts' superb qualifications, nor his
adherence to the rule of law. They were, purely and simply, the likely
substantive outcomes of the cases Roberts would decide, and, for
Senator Biden, cases involving the "right to privacy" in particular.
Remarkably, there were some Democratic Senators who did support
Roberts, but who did so based on their interpretation of his testimony
which led them to conclude not only that he would not overrule Planned
matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the
State.") (citations omitted).
92. Press Release, Joseph L. Biden, Jr., Biden Votes No on Judge Roberts, (Sept. 22, 2005),
available at http://biden.senate.gov/newsroomdetails.cfm?id=246272&.
93. Roberts Executive Session, supra note 53.
94. Id.
95. This is certainly the implication of Justice Scalia's opinion, which Justice Thomas joined,
in Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 979, 981 (1992) ("That is, quite simply, the issue in these cases: not
whether the power of a woman to abort her unborn child is a "liberty" in the absolute sense; or
even whether it is a liberty of great importance to many women. Of course it is both. The issue is
whether it is a liberty protected by the Constitution of the United States. I am sure it is not. I reach
that conclusion not because of anything so exalted as my views concerning the 'concept of
existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.' Rather, I reach it for
the same reason I reach the conclusion that bigamy is not constitutionally protected-because of
two simple facts: (1) the Constitution says absolutely nothing about it, and (2) the longstanding
traditions of American society have permitted it to be legally proscribed.") (citation omitted).
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Parenthoodv. Casey and Roe v. Wade, but that he supported a general
right to privacy, and eschewed the judicial philosophy of "originalist or
literalist philosophies." The best example was the closing statement of
Senator Herb Kohl (D-Wis.):
During a private meeting with him, as well as through four impressive
days of testimony, Judge Roberts made clear that he will be a modest
judge. He assures us that he will address each issue on its merits and
approach each argument with an open mind. He recognizes that judges
should not substitute their policy preferences for those of Congress,
and of course I agree. Judge Roberts sees a clear boundary to the
judge's role; [he] told us repeatedly that his personal views about
issues did not matter. He assured us that he will not be an activist, and
that he will rarely, if ever, look to overturn precedent; rather,
precedent, not his version of how the law should be, will mark the
beginning of his constitutional analysis.
Judge Roberts recognizes the right to privacy in the Constitution, and
he understands that people have a right to rely on it. He made clear his
agreement with the cases on the right to privacy that led to the court's
decisions in Roe and Casey.
Judge Roberts rejected originalist or literalist philosophies. He does
not bind the constitution to narrow interpretations of the past. Too
many judicial activists have used this philosophy to limit our rights
and freedoms. Judge Roberts believes that as society
evolves, our
96
interpretation of the Constitution must evolve with it.
Senator Kohl chose "to take Judge Roberts at his word and believe
that those words will bind him throughout his tenure on the court. 97
Senator Kohl, then, found Roberts to be precisely the man Senator
Biden did not. Senator Biden argued that Roberts' views on the right to
privacy were the issue, but Senator Kohl not only had no problems with
those views, he praised Roberts for his fidelity to precedent and to a
modest conception of the judicial role. To give credit where credit is
due, in other words, Senator Kohl's support for Roberts was not
ostensibly based on a partisan political agenda, but on Senator Kohl's
articulation of what he understood to be the demands of the rule of law.
The most interesting and articulate critic of John Roberts in the
Senate was Senator Charles Schumer (D-NY), who chaired the earlier
hearings on "judicial ideology." For many years, Republicans had
criticized liberal special interest groups for using the courts to achieve

96.
97.

Roberts Executive Session, supra note 53.
Id.
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things they could not at the ballot box. 9 8 Presumably realizing that the
best defense is often a good offense, Senator Schumer took the position
that:
[S]ome years ago a number of extreme groups and individuals decided
that they could not abide the direction that America was going in.
They tried to change America through the presidency. They won a few
elections. They tried to change it through Congress, but they could not
because those are elected branches of government, and electoral
politics fundamentally decides things in the middle. So they decided to

try and change America through the courts, the one non-elected
branch of government ....
In 2000, they helped elect a president who embraced their vision. That
president signaled that he agreed with
them that America could and
99
should be changed through the courts.

According to Schumer, President Bush indicated his willingness to
join this alleged Republican conspiracy to turn back the clock by
constantly praising Scalia and Thomas as his two favorite justices, and
"[t]hat meant that the president subscribed to their viewpoint that
America should be radically changed through the courts and that the
clock should be rolled back using legal theories like originalism and
strict constructionism." 10 0 Just as Cass Sunstein described conservative

98. For a sampling, see for example, Posting of A.J. Sparxx to polipundit.com, Liberal "Legal
Expert" Wants Supreme Court Increased, Jul. 27, 2007, http://polipundit.cornindex.php?p

=18347 ("We all know that liberals can't win at the ballot box, so they push their agenda through
judicial activism."); Michael Gaynor, "Scalito" to reenforce Scalia and Thomas, Oct. 31, 2005,
http://www.renewamerica.us/columns/gaynor/051031 ("'A liberal minority needs federal judges
to advance their agenda-allowing child pornography as free speech, mandating same-sex
marriage, removing 'under God' from the Pledge of Allegiance, banning school prayer and
preventing the death penalty for murderers and terrorists-because they can't win these issues at
the ballot box."'); or, most comprehensively, Eddie Thompson, The 2004 Elections: What The
Revolt [which gave George W. Bush reelection and solidified Republican control of Congress]

Was All About, Nov. 10, 2004, http://www.authorsden.com/visit/viewarticle.asp?id=15897
("After nearly half a century of using the Supreme Court of the United States of America to mold
our society contrary to the will of the people, liberal royalty fiddled while Pat Buchanan's
Cultural Revolution was burning in our streets, our churches, and our living rooms. They mocked
him; laughed him to scorn. They aren't laughing today. Hollywood belittled people of faith by
creating caricatures of fundamentalist Christians as Bible-toting pumpkins too stupid to take
seriously. They are taking them seriously today. Court decisions concerning abortion on demand,
prayer in school, and pornography as free speech were just the beginning. Middle America could
see the writing on the wall. Instead of capitulating, however, the majority availed themselves of
the one right not even the Supreme Court could steal from them: the right of self-determination at
the ballot box-the ultimate balance of power."); see also infra note 114 and accompanying text
(rebutting the contention that Republicans were trying to change the country through the courts
by noting the Republican success in the 2000 and 2004 elections).
99.

Roberts Executive Session, supra note 53.

100. Id.

450

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 39

jurists as "radicals," or "fundamentalists," ' 0 1 Schumer painted jurists
who wanted to undo the judicial legislation of the Warren and Burger
10 2
courts as reactionaries bent on taking away Americans' rights.
Schumer conceded that Roberts was "one of the best advocates, if not
the best advocate, in the nation," and that his intellectual powers were
formidable, but nevertheless, "being brilliant and accomplished is not
the number-one criteria for elevation to the Supreme Court. There are
many who would use their considerable talents and legal acumen to set
America back."10 3 Those "many," other than Thomas or Scalia, were
never identified, and it is very difficult to believe that even Thomas or
Scalia would view their jurisprudence as designed "to set America
back."
Presumably because Roberts, like virtually every nominee before
him, refused to give much of an indication as to which way he might
rule in cases that might come before him, Schumer all but accused
Roberts of misleading and deceiving. 10 4 He declared, "[t]here's an
obligation of nominees to answer questions fully and thoroughly,
because they're essential to figuring out a nominee's judicial philosophy
and ideology-to me, the most important criteria for choosing a
judge."' 1 5 But the idea of "judicial ideology" was that of Schumer and
10 6
his advisors, like Sunstein, Laurence Tribe, and Marcia Greenberger.
In the past, it had been the practice of both parties not to force nominees
to address specific cases that might come before them, a practice that
was followed, for example, with Justices Ginsburg and Breyer.
Schumer, in a splendid maneuver, or perhaps splendidly disingenuously,
said that attitude should not apply because the prior nominees were not
suspected of being part of a jurisprudential conspiracy "to set America
back." 107 Schumer claimed that because Roberts was a Bush nominee,
and because Bush embraced the views of Thomas and Scalia, two
justices bent on "set[ting] America back," there was a heavy

101. See generally Presser, Ann Coulter, infra note 150 (analyzing Sunstein's excoriation of
"right wing" judges who have a "radical" agenda and are "fundamentalists").
102. Roberts Executive Session, supra note 53.
103. Id.
104. See supra note 33 (stating that following the first term of the Roberts/Alito court, of
course, Senator Schumer crossed the line and did accuse Alito and Roberts of such deception).
105. Roberts Executive Session, supra note 53.
106. See York, supra note 30 (telling the story of these three serving as advisors to the
Democratic Senators).
107. Roberts Executive Session, supra note 53.
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presumption that Roberts was like them, and Roberts had not overcome
10 8
this presumption.
Schumer repeatedly asked Roberts to indicate some disagreement
with Thomas' views, including those on the right to privacy and on
Roberts quite
Congress' power under the commerce clause. 10 9
prudently refused to indicate disagreement with one of his future
colleagues, but this purportedly lost him Schumer's vote. Schumer had
gone into the hearings with a presumption of guilt against Roberts.
Unlike in the Courts, where one is innocent until proven guilty, in the
Senate, for Schumer, Roberts was guilty until proven innocent, and for
Schumer there was no such proof. Schumer said, "Judge Roberts is
clearly brilliant. His demeanor suggests he well might not be an
ideologue. But he did not make the case strongly enough to bet the
whole house." 110 Schumer conceded that there might be less than a
fifty percent chance of it, but still "there is a reasonable danger that he
will be like Justice Thomas, the most radical [sic] justice on the
Supreme Court." ' l ! Schumer concluded, "[b]ecause of that risk and its
enormous consequences for generations of Americans, I 2cannot vote
11
yes. I must reluctantly cast my vote against confirmation."
Senator John Comyn (R-Tex) had a hard time taking seriously
Schumer's views on what the Republicans were doing. In language of
extraordinary bluntness, he stated, "the notion that this president
[George W. Bush] and the party that has won the election in 2004,
2000, and who currently holds the majority in the Senate and in the
House are trying to change America through the courts is the exact
opposite of the truth." 113 In almost a point by point rebuttal of
Schumer, Senator Cornyn went on:
In fact, the most contentious issues we've had come before us,
whether it's the issue of same-sex marriage, whether people can
display the Ten Commandments in public, whether the Pledge of
Allegiance itself is constitutional because it contains the words "one
nation, under God," these are all examples of decisions and positions
being advocated by the minority in the courts who want to overturn
the ability of the majority to determine the rules and laws by which
our society is governed. And in fact, it's those who embrace this idea
of an evolving Constitution, that it is all about the courts making

108.
109.
110.
I11.
112.
113.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

Id.
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decisions that some judges feel is good for us and when they feel that
the majority is unable or unwilling to govern itself consistently 1with
14
the fundamental values and notions contained in the Constitution.
The contrast between Schumer's and Senator Comyn's comments in
the Senate clearly demonstrates that for the Democrats, the enemy
jurisprudence was originalism and strict construction, while for the
Republicans it was "this idea of an evolving Constitution." 115 Playing a
tune that pleased the Republicans, Senator Cornyn accused Schumer of
illegitimate behavior, playing politics with the Court, and undermining
the rule of law. 116 Scoffing at Schumer's complaint that Roberts had
refused to make clear how he would rule in cases that might come
before him (or, in Schumer's phrasing, revealing his "judicial
ideology") Senator Comyn said:
I submit that particularly in courts of law, no one-no one-is entitled
to know ahead of time what the outcome will be, because the very
premise of our judicial process is that courts are supposed to be fair
and listen to both sides or all sides of an argument, that judges are
supposed to be disinterested in the outcome and impartial, and that
judges, finally, be independent of the political process. So no one is
entitled to know what Judge Roberts-how Judge Roberts will rule on
these hot-button issues of the day. No one is. Senators are not entitled
to know, presidents are not entitled to know. In fact, I think what
the ideal of fairness, impartiality and
Judge Roberts demonstrated was
117
commitment to the rule of law.
The same point about the rule of law and judicial philosophy was
made by Senator Sam Brownback (R-Kan.). Commenting on Roberts'
failure under questioning from Senator Durbin to demonstrate that he
would always be on the side of the underdog, Senator Brownback
endorsed Roberts' view:
[I]f the Constitution says that the little guy should win, the little guy is
going to win in court before me. But if the Constitution says that the
big guy should win, well, then, the big guy is going to win, because
my obligation is to the Constitution. That's the oath. The oath that a
judge takes is not that I will look out for particular interests; the oath
and laws of the United States, and that's
is to uphold the Constitution
1 18
what I would do.
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Roberts Hearings, supra note 40, at 448.
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Senator Brownback argued, "I think that's exactly what the American
people expect and want, a judge to be a judge, not a partisan." 119
Finishing with the typical Republican flourish, Senator Brownback
stated:
[J]udges once confirmed are checked only by their own self-restraint.
It seems to me that this nominee sincerely believes and will adhere to
this check of judicial restraint. It's my hope that he'll set a model on
that that [sic] will be a nation of laws-governed by laws and not by
men.

12 0

Overall, the Roberts hearings made it clear that the Democratic and
Republican Senators had very different ideas of what a Supreme Court
Justice ought to do.
IV. JUDICIAL IDEOLOGICAL WARS CONTINUED: BORKING ALITO

The Roberts hearings had moments of contention, and clearly laid out
the parties' competing views on the judiciary, but they were just a
prelude to the coming battle over a nominee to succeed Justice
O'Connor. Everyone understood that Roberts would very likely
replicate the views of the Chief Justice who preceded him and for whom
he had clerked. But O'Connor was the swing vote on cases involving
abortion, affirmative action, and religion, and tended to vote on the side
favored by the Senate liberals. If Bush were to nominate someone in
the mold of Thomas or Scalia, that person would likely swing the Court
in a conservative rather than a liberal direction on these issues.
Accordingly, although the Republican and Democratic positions in
the Alito hearings were similar to those displayed in the Roberts'
hearings, the fireworks were more considerable. In the end, Alito was
confirmed by a much smaller majority than Roberts, 58-42, and only
four Democrats voted for his confirmation. 12 1 All of the Republicans,
save one, voted to confirm Alito. 12 2 As the Associated Press reported:
That is the smallest number of Senators in the party opposing a
president to support a Supreme Court Justice in modem history. Chief
Justice John Roberts got 22 Democratic votes last year, and Justice

119. Roberts Executive Session, supra note 53.
120. Id.
121. 152 CONG. REC. S348 (Jan. 31, 2006) (Rollcall Vote No. 2). Those Democrats voting
for Alito were Senators Byrd (D-W.Va.), Conrad (D-N.D.), Johnson (D-S.D.), and Nelson (DNeb.).
122. Id. The Republican who did not vote to confirm was Lincoln Chafee of Rhode Island.
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was confirmed in 1991 on a 52-48 vote-got
Clarence Thomas-who
123
11 Democratic votes.
John Kerry, fresh from his narrow loss of the Presidential election in
2004, unsuccessfully tried to organize a filibuster against the Alito
nomination, and remarked after the Alito confirmation that, "'United
States senators [who voted against Alito] refused to stand silent while
President Bush packed the Supreme Court with far-right
ideologues." ' 124 Picking up the theme that other liberal senators had
sounded in the Alito (and Roberts) hearings, Kerry said, "'[t]hose [who
voted against Alito] who believe in privacy rights, who fight for the
rights of the most disadvantaged, who believe in the balance of power
between the president and Congress took a stand in support of our
' 125
country and our Constitution."'
By Alito's confirmation, the clear nature of the parties' differences
over what kind of men and women ought to be appointed to the Court
appeared even more starkly than they did in the Roberts' hearing. John
Kerry called Alito, and by extension, Roberts, "far-right-ideologues,"
bent on trampling on the disadvantaged, upsetting the balance of
powers, and a danger to the country and Constitution.1 26 Unfortunately,
during the Alito hearings the Democrats overplayed their hand a bit.
Like Senators Kerry, Kennedy, and Schumer, Democrats sought to paint
Alito as not only an ideologue 27 but also as a bigot. 128 As the
Associated Press reported, the turning point came not at anything Alito
had said or done, but at the reaction of his wife to the Democrats'
strategy. Following a grilling by Senator Kennedy:
Mrs. Alito fled the hearing room in tears after Sen. Lindsey Graham,
R-S.C., expressed regret to Alito that Sen. Edward Kennedy, D-Mass.,
and other Democrats had attacked him for his membership in the
Conservative Alumni of Princeton (CAP).

123. Associated Press, Alito Sworn in as Supreme Court Justice, MSNBC, Jan. 31, 2006,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/l 1111624/.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. At the age of thirty-five while seeking a job as a lawyer in the Justice Department under
Reagan in 1985, Alito had made clear his belief that abortion and "one-person, one-vote" were
not protected by the Constitution. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito,
Jr. to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 12 (2006) [hereinafter Alito Hearings] (statement of Sen.
Edward Kennedy, Member, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary).
128. Id. at 12 (discussing Alito's voting record and alleged membership in an alumni group at
Princeton that opposed admission of women and wanted to limit the admission of racial
minorities).
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Some articles in CAP's magazine-not written by Alito-had voiced
inflammatory anti-feminist and anti-gay views. Graham asked Alito
whether he
was a "closet bigot." Alito replied, "I'm not any kind of
9
' 12

bigot."

As the National Affairs writer for MSNBC, Tom Curry indicated, "At
that moment and at many others during his testimony, Alito appeared to
be a sober, cautious and phlegmatic judge."' 130 He came from a lower
middle class family, he attended Princeton University and the Yale Law
School, he sat on the Court of Appeals in the Third Circuit, mainly in
Newark, New Jersey for fifteen years, and he garnered the respect of all
of his colleagues, a number of whom, in an unprecedented move,
13 1
testified to what a fair jurist Alito was.
Fifty-four of Judge Alito's law clerks, Democrats, Republicans and
Independents alike, signed a letter to the [Senate Judiciary] Committee
that stated "We collectively were involved in thousands of cases and it
never once appeared to us that Judge Alito has prejudged a case or
ruled based on political ideology.... It is our uniform experience that

Judge Alito was guided by his profound respect for the Constitution
and the limited role of the judicial branch. l132
Probably seeing the inevitable, even some Democrats tried to
distance themselves from the bullying and distorting tactics of some of
their colleagues. One of the four Democrats who voted to confirm
Alito, Senator Robert Byrd (D-W. Va.) asked, "[H]ave we finally come
to the point where our nation's assessment of its Supreme Court
nominee turns more on a simple-minded sound bite or an exploitive

129. Tom Curry, Why Bush Won the Alito Fight,MSNBC, Jan. 31, 2006, http://www.msnbc.
msn.com/id/1 1099780/.
130. Id.
131. See, e.g., Alito Hearings,supra note 127, at 660 (statement of Hon. Ruggero J. Aldisert)
("[B]ased on my experience, I can represent to this Committee that Judge Alito has to be included
among the first rank of the 44 judges with whom I have served on the Third Circuit, and
including another 50 judges on five other courts of appeals on which I have sat ....); id. at 65859 (statement of Hon. Maryanne Trump Barry) ("He is a fair-minded man, a modest man, a
humble man, and he reveres the rule of law. If confirmed... [he] will serve as a marvelous and
distinguished Associate Justice of the Supreme Court ....); id. at 654-55 (statement of Hon.
Edward R. Becker) ([W]e have sat on over a thousand cases together . . . . Sam Alito is a
wonderful human being.... Sam Alito is the soul of honor .... Judge Alito's intellect is of a
very high order. He is brilliant .... [He] is not an ideologue .... He is a real judge deciding
each case on the facts and the law, not on his personal views ....); id. at 663 (statement of Hon.
Leonard Garth) ("I have heard concerns expressed about whether Judge Alito can be fair and
evenhanded. Let me assure you from my extensive experiences with him and with my knowledge
of him, going back, as I have stated, over 30 years-that he will always vote in accordance with
the Constitution and laws as enacted by Congress.").
132. Alito Hearings, supra note 127, at 14 (statement of Hon. Charles E. Grassley, U.S.
Senator from Iowa).
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snapshot than on the answers provided or withheld by the
nominees?" 133 Thus, at least one Democrat disavowed what Curry
134
called a "contrived confirmation ritual."
Whatever legal academics might think, for the Senate Republicans, at
least rhetorically, the rule of law still existed, separation of powers still
existed, and it was the job of judges, like Chief Justice Roberts'
"umpires," to find the law rather than to make it, and to come to judging
without a preconceived agenda. For the Democrats, however, it was the
job of judges to expand the Constitution in order to protect the rights of
the least fortunate, even if that meant changing the interpretation of the
Constitution, and even if that meant a legislative role that ran against the
idea of the separation of powers. This was the Democrats' version of
the rule of law, since they believed it was the task of law to expand the
right of privacy, rights of minorities in general, and the benevolent
power of the federal government. Democrats preferred judges who
displayed a particular "ideology," or, to be more blunt, who were
committed to a particular result orientation-an orientation that would
preserve and enhance the right of privacy in particular, and a woman's
"right to choose" to have an abortion on demand.
For the Democrats and the liberal interest groups who supported
them, only "radicals" who wanted to oppress the poor, innocent, or
helpless invoked the separation of powers, original understanding, or
the rule of law as conceived by Thomas and Scalia. To sympathize with
Thomas or Scalia was to effectively consign women to back alley
abortions, or to erode minorities' civil rights. For the Democrats,
especially in the manner they sought to paint Alito, Alito was no
different from Robert Bork, and what he would do was essentially no
different from what it was claimed Bork would have done. Thus, for
those who sought to smear Alito, their playbook had been nicely written
by Senator Kennedy in his infamous 1987 "Robert Bork's America"
speech on the Senate floor. In that speech, Senator Kennedy stated that:
Robert Bork's America is a land in which women would be forced
into back-alley abortions, blacks would sit at segregated lunch
counters, rogue police could break down citizens' doors in midnight
raids, schoolchildren could not be taught about evolution, writers and
artists could be censored at the whim of government. 13 5

133.

Curry, supra note 129.

134. Id.
135. Kennedy's "Robert Bork's America" speech is quoted and its mendacity is analyzed in a
splendid article by Gerhard V. Bradley, Slaying the Dragon of Politics with the Sword of Law:
Bork's Tempting of America, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 243, 244 (1990) (reviewing ROBERT H. BORK,
THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW (1990)).
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No one who has read Bork's work could honestly reach such a
conclusion. 136 Senator Kennedy himself eventually admitted to Bork
that Bork should not take his attack personally, that it was merely
politics. 137
The tactic of shamelessly and falsely smearing a
conservative nominee came to be called "Borking," based on the
invention of horrendous consequences that would result from a
nominee's judicial philosophy, and for the ritualized assertion that the
nominee was far out of the judicial "mainstream." It called for the
conclusion that because the consequences of a nominee's jurisprudence
would be evil, then the nominee himself or herself must, accordingly, be
138
evil, or at least "radical."
It was not just Democratic Senators who tried to "Bork" Alito. As an
account in the Legal Times put it:
[L]iberal interest groups are staking their campaign against Samuel
Alito Jr. on a simple strategy: Transform Alito into Robert Bork by
any means possible-whether the shoe fits or not.
'There are many similarities,' notes People For the American Way's
Ralph Neas, who led the coalition opposed to Bork and is helping lead
the effort against Alito. Not least of these is that Alito, like Bork, is a
conservative judge picked to replace a moderate swing justice ....
But just how closely Alito's jurisprudence mirrors Bork's is open to
debate, but that's almost beside the point. What matters in the
mounting slugfest over Alito's nomination to the Supreme Court is
whether his opponents can sell the idea that the mild-mannered jurist
is just a quieter, gentler version of Bork...
[S]haping public opinion and then persuading constituents to roar at
their senators have become important elements of any judicial
[confirmation] campaign. But it's particularly crucial in Alito's
situation, where a handful of moderate Republicans and Democrats

136. Bork said of Kennedy's speech, "[N]ot one line of that tirade was true." BORK, supra
note 135, at 268. As Bork himself later put it, "A lot of lies were being told, and it would have
been good if somebody had been out there rebutting them .... Bork, now a distinguished fellow
at the conservative Hudson Institute, went on to say, "You have to have your countervailing
soundbites, although it's a hell of a world where we choose Supreme Court justices by
soundbites."

T.R. Goldman, Lobby Groups Following Bork Playbook for Alito, LEGAL TIMES,

Dec. 13, 2005, available at http://www.law.comjsp/article.jsp?id=l 134394504003.
137.

See BORK, supra note 1365, at 280-81.

138. Bork explained more generally:
The interest groups of the Left proceed by systematic lying about judicial nominees
who adopt the traditional approach of interpreting the Constitution according to its
actual meaning .... The left wing has discovered an effective tactic of labeling any
conventional jurist an ideologue with a right-wing agenda and hence 'outside the
mainstream.'
Robert H. Bork, Adversary Jurisprudence, THE NEW CRITERION, May 2002, at 17.
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will determine whether he cruises to confirmation next month, barely
squeaks by, loses an up-or-down vote, or is filibustered.
To defeat Alito, says John Samples, who directs the Cato Institute's
Center for Representative Government, opponents must prove 'not
just that he's conservative or1 39that he's against abortion personallythey need to show he's nuts.'
And that is precisely what Senate Democrats and liberal interest
groups tried to do, although Alito's nuttiness was purportedly
demonstrated simply by charging that he was "radical," "out of the
Thus,
mainstream," or unsympathetic to women and minorities.
Senators Kennedy, Schumer, and others insisted that Alito was fatally
tainted by his remarks when applying for a job in the Reagan justice
department against judicial activism and particular rights-expanding
They ignored
decisions by the Warren and Burger courts. 140
overwhelming evidence that Alito, like Roberts, had a clear reputation
of being fair-minded by his colleagues,14 1 as well as the rating from the
federal judiciary committee of the ABA stating that Alito, like Roberts,
was "well-qualified" for the bench, the highest rating that the ABA
awards. 142 That "well-qualified" rating had earlier been regarded as the
"gold standard" of judicial qualifications by some of the Democrats, 143
but in the effort to tarnish Alito, it suddenly held no persuasive power.
Academics were not absent from the attempt to "Bork" Alito, either.
Sunstein, now perhaps the most visible and distinguished liberal
scholar, purportedly had researched Alito's many judicial opinions, and,
as Senator Kennedy explained in the opening Alito Hearings:
Judge Alito has ruled the vast majority of the time against the claims
He has acted instead in favor of
of the individual citizens.
government, large corporations and other powerful interests. In a
study by the well-respected expert, Professor Cass Sunstein of the
University of Chicago Law School, Judge Alito was found to rule
against the individual in 84 percent of his dissents. To put it plainly,
average Americans have had a hard time getting a fair shake in his
139. Goldman, supra note 136.
140. See, e.g., Alito Hearings, supra note 127, at 12, 346-52 (statements of Sen. Edward
Kennedy, member, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary).
141. See supra note 131 (describing evidence of Alito's reputation).
142. See, e.g., Jesse J. Holland, Alito Gets High Marks from Bar Association, Jan. 4, 2006,
http://www.breitbart.com/article.php?id=D8EUOPRGI&showarticle=l (discussing Alito's repu-

tation).
143. See, e.g., Alito Hearings, supra note 127, at 14 (noting the unanimous "well qualified"
rating for Alito and observing that "this recommendation should have much weight for my
colleagues on the other side [that is the Democrats], who have time and time again described the
rating of the ABA as, quote, [the] 'gold standard"') (statement of Sen. Charles Grassley, Member,
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary).
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courtroom. In an era when America is still too divided by race and by
riches, Judge Alito has not written one single opinion on the merits in
favor of a person of color alleging
race discrimination on the job: in
I 44
15 years on the bench, not one.
Supporters of Alito, including fifty-four of his clerks and a number of
his third circuit colleagues, challenged the implication that Alito was
biased against anyone. 14 5 Yet even if Senator Kennedy's assertions
were correct, they would tell us nothing about the appropriateness of
Alito's jurisprudence. Judges do not choose their cases. Alito and his
supporters quite plausibly maintained that he decided cases on the law
rather than on the socioeconomic status of the parties, and a percentage
outcome against individuals, say, rather than corporations, tells us
nothing about who was in the right. What does it mean for Alito to rule
against individuals in eighty-four percent of his dissents? How many of
his votes writing majority opinions or concurring with them were for
individuals? Yet that does not matter either.
Similarly, Senator
Kennedy's careful phrasing that, "Judge Alito has not written one single
opinion on the merits in favor of a person of color alleging race
discrimination on the job," might well imply that he has written several
upholding race discrimination claims on a matter of procedure rather
than substance. As any lawyer knows, procedural rulings (involving
rules of evidence, motions for discovery, and many other matters) can
often determine the outcome of a case by encouraging a settlement.
This seems to be the same kind of "politics," rather than truthful
argument, in which Senator Kennedy engaged in the Bork matter.
Finally, it appears to be more than a coincidence that Sunstein,
Laurence Tribe, and Marcia Greenberger, all of whom had advised the
Democrats on political strategy with regard to the Bush nominees,
advocated hard-hitting attacks on the nominees, 14 6 attacks in which the
actual jurisprudence of the nominee mattered much less than the manner
in which his jurisprudence could be mischaracterized for partisan
47
purposes. 1

144. Id. at 12.
145. See supra note 131 (listing support for Alito).
146. See York, supra note 30 (reporting that Laurence Tribe of Harvard Law School; Cass
Sunstein of the University of Chicago School of Law, and Marcia Greenberger of the National
Women's Law Center "had appeared at a Democratic retreat and reportedly urged lawmakers to
take an aggressive stance against Bush's judicial nominees," because "[o]nly a more assertive and
openly ideological" approach by Senate Democrats could "stop the White House from packing
the courts with doctrinaire conservatives. Democrats simply had to be tougher on Bush
nominees").
147. See supra Part IV (discussing the strategy to demonize Alito).
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There have certainly been struggles over the confirmation of judicial
nominees in the past. One example is the struggle over Louis Brandeis,
a Massachusetts progressive lawyer and the first Jew nominated to the
Court. 148 What began with Bork was qualitatively different. With
Brandeis, one could probably discern anti-Semitism, or some other form
of elite bias against the nominee, but with Robert Bork it seemed to be
something different. It had become a broad-based mendacious and
scurrilous attack coordinated by special interest groups. With the
efforts to defeat the nominations of Roberts and Alito, we saw
coordination include a select group of liberal academics as well.1 4 9 By
the time the vote was taken on Alito, we also saw that there was a clear
party split. Perhaps it is fair to say that we had completely reached the
point where the need to satisfy political constituencies (at least in the
case of the Democrats) had taken the place of jurisprudential
considerations.
Some of our more strident, but most perceptive political
commentators on the right have argued that the current strategy of
committed liberals has been little more than name-calling of
conservatives, that liberals have resorted to slinging mud rather than
engaging in reasoned discourse with conservatives, and that liberals
have refused to debate conservatives on the issues, preferring instead, if
possible, to blacken their character. 150 This is now the tactic used
against Supreme Court nominees as well as talk radio hosts 15 1 and other
more overtly partisan actors.
And it is not simply Supreme Court justices who get themselves
tarred with the terms, "radical," "out of the mainstream," or "right
wing"-all characterizations hurled as epithets. MoveOn PAC, an archliberal political action committee, did a notable job in 2005, at the time
filibusters were being threatened against Bush nominees to the Court of
148.

Michael Boudin, Justice Brandeis: The ConfirmationStruggle and the Zionist Movement,

85 YALE L.J. 591, 591 (1976). "Brandeis was nominated by Woodrow Wilson in January, 1916,
and the nomination was met almost at once by fierce opposition. Conservative Bostonians,
boasting Harvard President A. Lawrence Lowell among them, petitioned the Senate against the
nomination; editorials inveighed against Brandeis as a radical; and segments of the bar denounced

Brandeis as unethical in character and unjudicial in temperament, in a campaign culminating in a
letter of opposition signed by ex-President Taft and six other present or former Presidents of the

American Bar Association." Id.
149. York, supra note 30.
150. The liberal reaction to Ann Coulter is probably the best example of liberals choosing
character attacks over reasoned discourse. See generally, Stephen B. Presser, Was Ann Coulter
Right? Some Realism About 'Minimalism', 5 AVE MARIA L. REV. 23 (2007) [hereinafter Presser,

Ann Coulter] (summarizing Ann Coulter's argument that liberals refuse to debate the real issue).
151. See, e.g., AL FRANKEN, RUSH LIMBAUGH IS A BIG FAT IDIOT AND OTHER
OBSERVATIONS (1996) (satirically attacking Limbaugh and the political right).
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Appeals bench, of painting these lower-court nominees as villains. 152 At
that time, the latest Star Wars movie was popular, featuring an evil
galactic Senator bent on nefarious domination. MoveOn PAC ran a
brilliant television spot and a broadside ad, criticizing the Republicans
in general and Senator Bill Frist (R-Tenn.) for considering a procedural
tactic, known as the "nuclear option," which would have eliminated
Senate filibusters for judicial candidates through a simple majority
vote. 153 A poster featured a cloaked figure that bore a resemblance to
the evil "Sith" Senator from the Star Wars movie, and the text read:
The Republic stands at the brink of chaos. Seduced by a dark vision of
ultimate power, one Senator schemes to destroy all opposition,
replacing the old guardians of peace and justice with his own loyal
minions. Sound familiar?
We're not talking about a galaxy far, far away.
Right now, in Washington, D.C. Senator Bill Frist and radical
Republicans are preparing to seize total control over our independent
courts, long the defenders of freedom in our republic. To dominate the
courts, Senator Frist is threatening to use the ultimate weapon, the
"nuclear option," breaking senate rules to eliminate the right to
filibuster-giving absolute rower over judicial nominations to one
party for the first time ever. 154
155
Senator Frist was not, of course, seeking to "break senate rules."
Rather, he sought, in effect, to amend them to clarify that the filibuster,
itself a creature of Senate rules, was not intended to stall judicial
nominees, and by using it in that context, the Democrats were wrongly
sabotaging the choice of the majority. 15 6 Still, with this wonderful and
literally diabolical ad, MoveOn PAC turned the tables on the
152. The term used for the nominees was "far right clones," whom President Bush had
designated to replace "fair judges." See generally David Chang, One Senator Leans Toward the
Dark Side, USC DAILY TROJAN, May 25, 2005 ("To capitalize on last week's release of the final
installment in the "Star Wars" series, MoveOn PAC has released a new ad, which evokes the
film's storyline of a power-hungry senator to parody the current controversy over judicial

nominees.").
153. For a discussion about the "nuclear option," called by the Republicans the
"Constitutional Option," see, e.g., Helen Dewar and Mike Allen, GOP May Target Use of
Filibuster: Senate Democrats Want To Retain the Right to Block Judicial Nominees, WASH.
POST, Dec. 13, 2004, at AI, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/

A59877-2004Dec12.html (discussing the political climate surrounding former Chief Justice
Rehnquist's possible vacancy).
154. Move-on.org and the Ethics of Silly Arguments, May 23, 2005, http://www
.ethicsscoreboard.com/list/moveon.html (quoting, discussing, and criticizing the Moveon.org
broadside).
155. See Dewar & Allen, supra note 153, at Al (noting that the Constitution only calls for the

advice and consent of the Senate, not a two-thirds vote).
156. Id.
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Republicans and argued that they were seeking to interfere with
freedom by "eliminat[ing] the right to filibuster," a right which existed
only in the Senate rules. 157 Moreover, MoveOn PAC's ad made the
rather extraordinary assertion that a Senate "majority vote"
amounted to
15 8
"absolute power over judicial nominations" in one party.
The overheated rhetoric of MoveOn PAC did not differ in degree
from that of at least one distinguished academic, the University of
Chicago's Sunstein. In his boldly titled book, Radicals in Robes: Why
Right-Wing Courts are Wrong for America, Sunstein accused Justices
Scalia and Thomas and originalist jurists like them on the lower courts,
whom he labeled "fundamentalists," of plotting to take away the rights
159
of Americans and impose a religious-like orthodoxy on them.
Sunstein compared these judicial "fundamentalists" to homegrown
intolerant religious fundamentalists, such as Jerry Fallwell, and to such
foreign apostles of fundamentalism as the Taliban. 160 Sunstein made
clear his preference for the kind of jurisprudence manifested by
Republican jurists like Sandra Day O'Connor and Anthony Kennedy,
who, particularly in right of privacy cases, would not disturb established
16 1
precedents like Roe v. Wade.

V.

"THE MYSTERY PASSAGE," "THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY," AND THE ROLE
OF JUDGES

As indicated, much of the questioning of Roberts and Alito revolved
around the "right of privacy," and much of the bare-knuckle politics
was a simple fight over whether Roe v. Wade would survive. Another
way of looking at this jurisprudential struggle is to say that the
confirmation battles over Roberts and Alito (and Thomas and Bork
before them) were over a particular act of judicial legislation-Roe v.
157. Move-on.org, supra note 154.
158. Id.
159. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 25, at 55 (noting that fundamentalists claim their
constitutional approach is the only legitimate approach to constitutional interpretation).
160. Id; see also Presser, Ann Coulter, supra note 150, at 27-31 (objecting to Sunstein's
characterization of conservatives as "fundamentalists" but conceding that some of his arguments
have merit including his interpretation that the Second Amendment affords a right to a militia and
not firearm ownership, and his interpretation that the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause did intend for the Constitution to be "color blind," are both legitimate).
161. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 25, at 30 (stating that minimalist judges, like O'Connor, are
cautious and that the law should be moved by nudges, not earthquakes). These precedents were,
of course, based on an interpretation of the Constitution (finding a right to privacy in penumbras
and emanations of the Bill of Rights which purportedly guaranteed women a right to choose to
terminate pregnancies), and would, at least in the opinion of Justice Kennedy, extend this right of
privacy to protect consensual homosexual sodomy from prosecution. Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558, 562-65 (2003).
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Wade. Perhaps it does not go too far to say that this question was about
the extent to which the value of separation of powers ought to trump the
"right of privacy." Or, put only slightly differently, the issue was
whether Justice Anthony Kennedy's jurisprudence, praised in the
Roberts hearings by Senator Biden, 162 should dominate on the Court as
it now does, or should instead be replaced by traditional attitudes
toward judicial legislation and traditional conservative originalist
jurisprudence.
An example puts this at its starkest. Following his confirmation,
Justice Kennedy explained his vote in Planned Parenthoodv. Casey in
the three person plurality opinion which upheld the "essence" of Roe v.
Wade, and reinforced the constitutional availability of abortion on
demand, 163 in part by writing that "at the heart of liberty is the right to
define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and
of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not
define the attributes of personhood were they found under the
164
compulsion of the state."
Justice Kennedy later used this reasoning to support his decision in
Lawrence v. Texas, holding that the State could not make consensual
homosexual sodomy a crime. 165 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court quoted similar language from the Casey plurality opinion in its
majority decision finding a right to marriage between same-sex partners
in the Massachusetts Constitution. 166 It has been argued that the
"mystery passage," means that no government, local, state or national,
can legislate morality. It has been claimed also that the "mystery

162. See supra notes 88-95 and accompanying text (discussing Senator Biden's impressions
during the confirmation hearings).
163. Until Alito and Roberts joined the Court, the Court's abortion decisions could surely be
read as amounting to "abortion on demand." See generally Clarke D. Forsythe & Stephen B.
Presser, Restoring Self-Government on Abortion: A Federalism Amendment, 10 TEX. REV. L. &
POL. 301, 304 (2005); Clarke D. Forsythe & Stephen B. Presser, The Tragic Failure of Roe v.
Wade: Why Abortion Should be Returned to the States, 10 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 85, 88 (2005)
("No state can effectively prohibit any abortion, at any time of pregnancy, for any reason."). With
the current composition of the Court however, more regulation of abortion seems permissible, for
example, the grisly procedure of intact dilation and extraction, or as its detractors call it "partial
birth abortion." Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S.Ct. 1610, 1632 (2007) (stating that the Partial Birth
Abortion Ban Act of 2003 prohibiting intact dilation and evacuation procedures both before and

after viability is not unconstitutional).
164. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (Kennedy, J., O'Connor, J., and
Souter. J., plurality opinion).
165. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574 (Kennedy, J., majority opinion).
166. Goodridge v. Dept. of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003) ("'Our obligation
is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral code."' (quoting Lawrence, 539 U.S.

at 559).
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passage" means the Court is claiming "the unconstrained power to
define for all Americans which particular interests it thinks should be
' 16 7
beyond the bounds of citizens to address through legislation."
The "mystery passage," derided by Justice Scalia as the "sweetmystery-of-life" passage, 16 8 offers a Justice like Kennedy the power to
infuse the Constitution with a radically individualistic approach to life
and to find unconstitutional any sort of legislation based on morals.
Justice Scalia believes that with Lawrence v. Texas, and presumably
with the "mystery passage," the Court majority "has taken sides in the
[ongoing] culture war," and legislatively imposed its radically
individualistic cultural preferences on the nation. 169 This was done in
the name of the Constitution, of course; Scalia's point was that the
Lawrence Court did not respect the separation of powers. Indeed, it was
reading things into the Constitution that were not there.
The Senate critics of Alito and Roberts seemed to embrace the right
of privacy, and their reading of the right of privacy, at least insofar as
Justice Kennedy was quoted in support of it, certainly seemed similar to
the "mystery passage."' 170 But the "mystery passage" is maddeningly
obscure. We do not make up the meaning of life or the universe on our
own. Culture, and even the state, is indispensable in forming our
identities and our values.
In its obscurity, the "mystery passage" gives license to judges to do
whatever they want-in short, to impose their values on us. As Scalia
implies, questions about the meaning of life may be better addressed by
Democratic institutions, like the legislature, if they are addressed by
government at all. Constitutional rulings should not turn on individual
justices' conceptions of the universe. 17 1 It seems better to let such
matters turn on the original understanding of the Constitution, at least if
that original meaning can be discerned, and if our democratic tradition
and our traditional Blackstonian understanding of the rule of law is to
be maintained. In short, judges should be bound by the rule of law, and
should not have the discretion legislatively to insert their own particular
political, philosophical, moral, or cultural views into the Constitution.

167. M. Edward Whelan HI, Senate Testimony on Roe v. Wade, June 22, 2005, available at
http://www.eppc.org/publications/pubID.2377/pub-detail.asp.

168. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 588 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
169. Id. at 602 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Court has taken sides in the culture war,
departing from its role of assuring, as neutral observer, that the democratic rules of engagement

are observed.").
170. Id.
171. Id.
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VI. CONCLUSION: THE "ANTI-MYSTERY PASSAGE"

The "mystery passage" authorizes the courts to dispense with
morality, but it ought to be understood that our eighteenth century
founders generally embraced morality. 172
My favorite founder's
statement is that from Samuel Chase, a colorful figure who was the only
United States Supreme Court justice ever to be impeached, but who also
was a powerful intellect, fully in the mainstream of federalist
jurisprudence. 173 In a time of national turmoil, Chase reminded his
grand jurors:
First that our free Republican Governments cannot be preserved
without the Republican virtues of probity, and industry;frugality, and
temperance. 2d That without the restraint of Laws Liberty cannot exist
in a State of Society. 3d That good Laws cannot be put in execution
without good morals; and 4th That Religion and piety; morality and
virtue, are the only pure foundations of National happiness.-Any
government, whatever may be its form, that does not give protection
and Security to the property and the Civil and religious liberties of its
Citizens is unworthy of obedience, and defense.-Any government
that does not distinguish virtue; discourage vice; and reward merit,
174
cannot deserve the respect and esteem of its Citizens.

This 1802 Grand Jury charge might be thought of as the "antimystery passage." Where the "mystery passage" is all about radical
individualism, if not secular humanism, Chase's words show a
preference for morals, religion, virtue and, thus, altruism. "Privacy,"
while it might perhaps still be protected through the protection of
property and civil and religious liberties, was not at the center of that
jurisprudential universe. 175 Virtue, altruism, self-sacrifice, and the
community were.
The "mystery passage" is all about "self172. I have tried to make this case in two monographs. See generally STEPHEN B. PRESSER,
THE ORIGINAL MISUNDERSTANDING: THE ENGLISH, THE AMERICANS AND THE DIALECTIC OF
FEDERALIST JURISPRUDENCE 7 (Carolina Academic Press 1991) (attempting to delineate original
structural understanding of the Constitution and to elaborate on supraconstitutional principles of
government the drafters meant to embody); RECAPTURING, supra note 8, at 42-49 (arguing that

in order to fully grasp the original intent of the framers, we must acknowledge the crucial linkage
between religion, morality, and the law, as the framers understood it).
173. See generally ORIGINAL MISUNDERSTANDING, supra note 172, at 37-47 (discussing the
jurisprudence of Justice Chase, and its contribution to the political climate during the early years
of our nation and beyond).
174. RECAPTURING, supra note 8, at 90-91.
The quotation is from Samuel Chase's
manuscript Jury Charge Book, found in the Vertical File of the Manuscript Division of the
Maryland Historical Society in Baltimore. The book is a collection of jury charges Chase made
to grand juries in 1798-1800, 1802-1803, and 1805-1806. The quoted portions are found on
pages 34-35 of the manuscript from a jury charge delivered in 1802.
175. Id. at 91 (suggesting that morality and religion are at the center of the jurisprudential
universe).
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actualization," 176 but the earlier legal tradition Chase represented was
177
something different.
At this point in our jurisprudential history, I have tried to suggest that
the right of privacy, and the world view of the "mystery passage" are in
the ascendant, but there is a clash of cultural values, as represented by
the senatorial defenders of Roberts and Alito, and perhaps it is time
once again for their views to receive a fair hearing in the academy.
Perhaps it is significant that the flag protection amendment, which once
garnered the support of eighty percent of the American people, 178 could
79
find only a handful of proponents in the American legal academy. 1
Given that Americans generally have been a moderate people,
whenever there is a clash of values, there is a tendency to try to find
some compromise for the sake of peace, to forge some Aristotelian
mean. The Alito and Roberts (and before them the Bork and Thomas)
hearings were not about compromise, but were about stark ideological
or at least philosophical positions-a war between individualists and
traditionalists. It is probably significant that Sunstein has tried to come
up with a judicial philosophy based on pragmatic compromise, one
which he calls "judicial minimalism." 180
Sunstein's "judicial
minimalism,"
though, typified by Justices Kennedy1 81 and
O'Connor, 182 appears to endorse many if not all of the problematic acts
of judicial legislation regarding the Commerce Clause, race, religion,

176. See id. at 13-16 (discussing "self-actualization" and what it means in contemporary
constitutional law).
177. Id. at 91 ("Chase's thought . . .might be fairly summed up by suggesting that [he]
believed that there could be no law, constitutional or otherwise, without morality and that there
could be no morality without religion.").
178. Flag ProtectionAmendment Failsin the Senate, 3/29/2000, http://usgovinfo.about.com/
library/news/aa032900b.htm ("Standing in front of an American flag, Sen. Hatch closed debate
on the Flag Protection Amendment earlier today stating that it carried the support of 80 percent of
the American people, and urging its passage.").
179. My own experience as a consultant to the Citizens' Flag Alliance (CFA), a grassroots
organization advocating the passage of the Flag Protection Amendment, has been that few legal
academics openly supported its passing. One other American law professor, Richard Parker of
Harvard, also served as an occasional consultant to the CFA. Both Parker and I testified before
assorted congressional committees urging the passage of the amendment, but to the best of my
knowledge only one other law professor, Colorado's Robert F. Nagel, made an argument similar
to ours. While I suspect other law professors shared our views, I can testify with some certainty
we were a tiny minority in the academic community.
180. See generally SUNSTEIN, supra note 25, at xii, 27-31 (explaining minimalist
philosophy); Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105 MICH. L. REv. 353, 362 (2006),
available
at
http://www.michiganlawreview.org/archive/105/2/sunstein.pdf
(defining
minimalism).
181. SUNSTEIN, supra note 25, at 31, 92-99 (contending that Justice Kennedy is a minimalist).
182. Id. at 29-20, 146-50 (contending that Justice O'Connor is a minimalist).
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and abortion of recent years. 18 3 If this is "minimalism," or even
"moderation," these words, for Sunstein, have a different meaning than
most people would derive from them.
It is perhaps significant that the new Chief Justice has indicated his
184
desire to respect precedent, and only modestly correct judicial errors.
Perhaps he and Justice Alito may seek moderation as a jurisprudential
philosophy. On the other hand, the fact that Justice Kennedy has so
often ended up the swing vote on the plethora of 5-4 cases in the 20062007 term may indicate that now the future of the Court is in Justice
Kennedy's hands, 185 who actually follows no particular jurisprudential
philosophy. His record this last term simply demonstrates his desire for
a particular set of results.
Perhaps we can do better. If the Senate hearings teach us anything, it
is that if one school of jurisprudence really did stand for the rule of law,
and the other jurisprudence stood for making the rules up as the judges
went along, maybe, as hinted earlier, we should not seek moderation
and compromise. As indicated earlier, if we still aspire to have a
government of laws not men, then moderation and compromise on
jurisprudence are attempts to reach an Aristotelian mean between good
and evil, and not to be recommended.
The Democrats in the Senate who voted against John Roberts and
Samuel Alito appeared to like the idea of courts expanding rights in
general and the conception of the "mystery passage" in particular. For
these Democrats, the idea of courts making law appeared to be fine, but
to approve of this notion is, of course, to weaken the separation of
powers. To embrace the "mystery passage," then, is to seriously
weaken, and maybe even to abandon the separation of powers.
Blackstone, Montesquieu, and Hamilton would have hesitated before
signing on to the "mystery passage." So should we.
Perhaps it is, after all, more than a bit naive to argue that judges do
not make law and perhaps our politicians simplified the issues at stake
183. Id. at 27-30.
184. This seems to be the thrust of his majority opinions in the cases involving school
assignments based on race and campaign finance reform. See e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty.
Schs. vs. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2753-54 (2007) (abrogating Comfort v. Lynn
Sch. Comm., 418 F.3d 1 (2005)); Fed. Election Comm'n v. Wisc. Right to Life, Inc. 127 S. Ct.
2652, 2654 (2007) (clarifying McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003)).
185. For a discussion of Justice Kennedy's importance, see Linda Greenhouse, Clues to the
New

Dynamic on

the Supreme Court, N.Y.

TIMES,

July

3,

2007

available at,

http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/03/washington/03memo.html?ex= 1188360000&en=ee6c62b0a
b3878ae&ei=5070 ("A new dynamic emerged in the Court's last term, which ended last week
with Justice Kennedy standing in the middle, all alone. Not only the lawyers, but also the justices
themselves, are now in the business of courting him.").
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in the confirmation hearings in order to energize and seek the approval
of their political bases, particularly with regard to the right to privacy
and the issue of abortion. Nevertheless, when we confront that issue,
there does seem to be a difference between those who argue for leaving
matters to the legislature and those who favor a more expansive role for
the courts. Law professors can deride the "going around in circles about
whether the nominee will just 'find' the law or will actively seek to
remake it in his own image."186 Nonetheless, what is being circled
about are separation of powers and the rule of law itself, and, if we still
favor popular sovereignty and self-government, these should still matter
to us.

186. For such derision see the prepared statement of Laurence Tribe, Alito Hearings, supra
note 127, at 1507.

